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ABSTRACT 
Learning to see through data is central to contemporary 
forms of algorithmic knowledge production. While often 
represented as a mechanical application of rules, making 
algorithms work with data requires a great deal of situated 
work. This paper examines how the often-divergent 
demands of mechanization and discretion manifest in data 
analytic learning environments. Drawing on research in 
CSCW and the social sciences, and ethnographic fieldwork 
in two data learning environments, we show how an 
algorithm’s application is seen sometimes as a mechanical 
sequence of rules and at other times as an array of situated 
decisions. Casting data analytics as a rule-based (rather 
than rule-bound) practice, we show that effective data 
vision requires would-be analysts to straddle the competing 
demands of formal abstraction and empirical contingency. 
We conclude by discussing how the notion of data vision 
can help better leverage the role of human work in data 
analytic learning, research, and practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Algorithmic data analysis has come to enable new ways of 
producing and validating knowledge [15, 25]. Algorithms 
are integral to many contemporary knowledge practices, 
especially ones that rely on the analysis of large-scale 
datasets [15, 20, 21, 34]. At the same time, we know that 
algorithms can be selective [34], subjective [7], and biased 
[3]; that they work on multiple assumptions about the world 
and how it functions [5, 15, 34, 35]; and that they 
simultaneously enable and constrain possibilities of human 
action and knowledge [5, 6]. Algorithmic knowledge 
production is a deeply social and collaborative practice with 
sociocultural, economic, and political groundings and 
consequences. 
In all these ways, data analysis embodies a distinct and 
powerful way of seeing the world. Data analysts learn to 
represent and organize the world through computational 
forms such as graphs, matrices, and a host of standardized 
formats, enabling them to make knowledge claims based on 
algorithmic analyses. But this is just one half of the story. 
The world doesn’t always neatly fit into spreadsheets, 
matrices, and tables. While data analysis is often 
understood as the work of faceless and unbiased numbers 
and algorithms, a large amount of situated and discretionary 
work is required to organize and manipulate the world 
algorithmically. Effective algorithmic analysis also 
demands mastery of the ways that worlds and tools are put 
together, and which worlds and tools are so combined 
(across the wide range of methods, tools, and objects 
amenable to representation). Taken together, these two 
seemingly contradictory features constitute what we call 
data vision: the ability to organize and manipulate the 
world with data and algorithms, while simultaneously 
mastering forms of discretion around why, how, and when 
to apply and improvise around established methods and 
tools in the wake of empirical diversity. 
Integrated, often seamlessly, in the practice of expert 
practitioners, these contradictory demands stand out with 
particular clarity in the moments of learning and 
professionalization through which novices learn to master 
and balance the intricacies of data vision. How do students 
learn to “see” the world through data and algorithms? How 
do they learn to maneuver and improvise around forms and 
formalizations in the face of empirical contingency? This 
paper addresses such questions in the context of data 
analytic learning environments such as classrooms and 
workshops. 
While distinct from other contexts of professional practice 
(e.g., industry settings or research centers), learning 
environments provide partial but meaningful sites to 
understand some of the ways in which would-be 
practitioners are immersed and acculturated into 
professional discourse and practice. [On the relation and 
relevance of learning environments for ‘mature’ 
professional practice, see inter alia 8, 16, and 24]. The 
explicit focus in learning environments on demonstrating 
established methods and theories to would-be professionals 
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allows us to see how particular pedagogic demonstrations 
and analytic examples enable specific algorithmic norms 
and heuristics. More importantly, a study of classrooms and 
workshops draws attention to the social aspects of learning 
– a process of participation and membership in a discourse, 
instead of just a set of individual experiences. In learning 
environments, aspects of professionalization are 
accomplished through guided interactions between 
instructors, students, teaching assistants, educational 
materials, assignments, and exams. Learning environments 
thus function as important sites in which would-be data 
analysts learn to see the world through and as data – a 
crucial rite of passage on their way to becoming full-
fledged members in the data analytic “community of 
practice.” [24] 
This paper describes two separate sequences of events – 
one from a machine-learning classroom, and another from a 
series of digital humanities workshops – to show how 
learning to see through data requires students to maintain a 
balance between viewing the world through abstract 
constructs, while simultaneously adapting to empirical 
contingency. We advance a rule-based (as opposed to a 
rule-bound) understanding of data analytic practice, 
highlighting the situated interplay between formal 
abstraction and mechanical routinization on the one hand, 
and discretionary action and empirical contingency on the 
other. We show how it is the mastery of this interplay – and 
not just the practice of data analytic techniques in their 
formal dimension – that is central to the growing skill and 
efficacy of would-be data analysts. We argue that better 
understanding of data vision in its more comprehensive and 
discretionary forms can help researchers and instructors 
better engage and leverage the human dimensions and 
limits of data analytic learning and practice.  
The sections that follow begin by reviewing CSCW, HCI, 
and social science literatures on professional vision, 
situated knowledge, and discretionary practice. We then 
describe our research sites, before moving to the empirical 
examples. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
the notion and practice of data vision, and the distinction 
between a rule-bound and rule-based understanding of data 
analysis, for data analytic learning and practice, and for 
CSCW research and practice more broadly. 
PROFESSIONAL VISION, SITUATED KNOWLEDGE, AND 
DISCRETIONARY PRACTICE 
Our work on data vision builds on a classic and growing 
body of work in the social sciences that has explored forms 
of identity, practice, and perception underpinning and 
constituting forms of professional knowledge. Goodwin’s 
work on professional vision [16] analyzes two professional 
activities (archaeological field excavation and legal 
argumentation) to show how professionals learn to “see” 
relevant objects of professional knowledge with and 
through practice: the exposure to and exercise of theories, 
methods, and tools to produce artifacts and knowledge in 
line with professional goals. Learning professional practice, 
he argues, help professionals make salient specific aspects 
of phenomena, transforming them into objects of 
knowledge amenable to professional analysis. Learning to 
see the world professionally, however, is not reducible to 
the mastery of generic rules and formal techniques. Instead, 
professional vision is slowly and carefully built through 
training, socialization, and immersion into professional 
discourse [16, 24, 30, 32]. Professional vision, thus, is a 
substantive and collaborative sociocultural accomplishment 
– a way of seeing the world constructed and shaped by a 
“community of practice.” [24] 
A key aspect of professional vision, as Abbott [1] argues, is 
the way in which practitioners situate given problems 
within existing repertoires of professional knowledge, 
methods, and expertise. According to Abbott, the process of 
situating given problems – of “seeing” professionally – 
must be clear enough for professionals to create relations 
between a given problem and existing knowledge (e.g., 
what can I say about this specific dataset?), yet abstract, 
even ambiguous, enough to enable professionals to create 
such relations for a wide variety of problems (e.g., what are 
the different kinds of datasets about which I can say 
something?). 
A similar interplay between abstraction, clarity, and 
discretion exists within data analytic practices. Algorithms, 
developed in computational domains such as machine-
learning, information retrieval, and natural language 
processing, provide means of analyzing data. It is often 
argued that a specific algorithm can work on multiple 
datasets as long as the datasets are modeled in particular 
ways. However, data analysis requires much more work 
than simply applying an algorithm to a dataset. As 
Mackenzie argues: certain data analytic practices such as 
vectorization, approximation, and modeling often mask the 
inherent subjectivity of dataset and algorithms, imbuing 
them with a sense of inherent “generalization.” [26] From 
choice of analytic method, to choices concerning data 
formatting, to decisions about how best to represent and 
communicate data analytic results to ‘outside’ audiences, a 
large amount of situated and discretionary work – e.g., in 
the form of data collection, data cleaning, data modeling, 
and other forms of pre- and post-processing – is required to 
make datasets work with chosen algorithms. Data analysts 
not just learn to see and organize the world through data 
and algorithms, but also learn and discern meaningful and 
effective combinations of data and algorithms. As Gitelman 
et al. [15] argue: “raw data” – at least as a workable entity – 
is an oxymoron. It takes work to make data work. 
Abbott’s [1] example of chess is instructive in evoking the 
situated and discretionary work characteristic of all forms 
of practice. The opening and closing moves in a game of 
chess, Abbott argues, often appear methodical and rigorous. 
However, in between these two moves, he argued, is the 
game itself in which knowledge, expertise, and experience 
intermingle as the game progresses. On one hand, we can 
summarize and teach chess as a collection of formal rules 
and techniques (e.g., how a pawn moves, how the rook 
moves, ways to minimize safe moves for your opponent, 
etc.). On the other hand, however, we have to acknowledge 
that any and all application of such rules is situated – 
contingent to the specific layout of the game at hand. In this 
way, chess (and professional vision) is rule-based but not 
rule-bound – a distinction we return to in the discussion.  
These insights are backed in turn by a long line of 
pragmatist social science dealing with the nature of 
‘routines’ and ‘routinizable tasks’ in organizational and 
other contexts. Building on Dewey’s [12] foundational 
work, Cohen [9] argues against the common understanding 
of routinized tasks as collections of rigid and mundane 
actions, guided by “mindless” rules and mechanized 
actions; instead, the performance of a routine is both skilled 
and unique: 
“For an established routine, the natural fluctuation of 
its surrounding environment guarantees that each 
performance is different, and yet, it is the ‘same.’ 
Somehow there is a pattern in the action, sufficient to 
allow us to say the pattern is recurring, even though 
there is substantial variety to the action.” [9: 782] 
Klemp et al. [22] also draw on Deweyan roots to address 
these “similar, yet different” applications of routines 
through the vocabulary of plans, takes, and mis-takes. 
There might be a plan (a method, an algorithm, a script), 
and there might be known mistakes (incompatibility, 
inefficiency, misfit), but every application of the plan is a 
take ripe for mis-takes. Mis-takes occur when professionals 
are faced with something unexpected during the execution 
of formal and established routines. Drawing on the example 
of a Thelonious Monk jazz performance, the authors 
explore the complex discretionary processes by which a 
musician deals with mis-takes: 
“When we listen to music, we hear neither plans nor 
mistakes, but takes in which expectations and 
difficulties get worked on in the medium of notes, tones 
and rhythms. Notes live in connection with each other. 
They make demands on each other, and, if one note 
sticks out, the logic of their connections demands that 
they be reset and realigned.” [22: 10] 
Mis-takes, then, mark elements of “contingency, surprise, 
and repair [found] in all human activities.” [22: 4] 
Signifying the lived differences between theoretical reality 
and empirical richness, mis-takes necessitate situated, often 
creative, improvisations on the part of professionals and 
other social actors. 
Like Abbott’s description of chess, Klemp et al.’s analysis 
draws out the situated nature of professional knowledge and 
practice, even in apparently straightforward and routinized 
procedures. This point is further elaborated by Feldman & 
Pentland [14], who show how routines are ostensive (the 
structural rule-like elements of a routine) as well as 
performative (the situated and contingent execution of a 
routine). It is the interplay between the two aspects that 
allows for the discernable but shifting reality of routinized 
work and professional practice. Along similar lines, 
Wylie’s study of paleontology laboratories [37] shows how 
adapting situated routines and practices to deal with new 
problems-at-hand is considered an integral aspect of 
learning by doing. “Problem-solving in ways acceptable to 
a field [...] can be an indicator of skill, knowledge, and 
membership in that particular field.” [37: 43] 
However, the situatedness of a practice is not always 
visible. Ingold [17: 98], using the example of a carpenter 
sawing planks, describes how to an observer, “it may look 
as though […a] carpenter is merely reproducing the same 
gesture, over and over again.” Such a description, he 
reminds us, is incomplete: 
“For the carpenter, [...] who is obliged to follow the 
material and respond to its singularities, sawing is a 
matter of engaging ‘in a continuous variation of 
variables…” [17: 98] 
To improvise on seemingly routine tasks then is to “follow 
the ways of the world, as they open up, rather than to 
recover a chain of connections, from an end-point to a 
starting-point, on a route already travelled.” [17: 97] 
Such social science insights on professional vision and 
discretionary practice have translated into important CSCW 
and HCI research programs. For instance, Suchman and 
Trigg [32] demonstrate the role and significance of 
representational devices for ways in which Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) researchers see and produce professional 
objects and knowledge. Mentis, Chellali, & Schwaitzberg 
[27] show how laparoscopic surgeons demonstrate ways of 
“seeing” the body through imaging techniques to students: 
“seeing” the body in a medical image is not a given, but a 
process requiring discussion and interpretation. Mentis & 
Taylor [28] similarly argue that “work required to see 
medical images is highly constructed and embodied with 
the action of manipulating the body.” Situating objects or 
phenomena in representations, they argue, is a situated act: 
representations don’t just reveal things, but also produce 
them, turning the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of the 
world [19] into stable and tractable “objects” amenable to 
analytic and other forms of action. 
Performing analytical and other forms of action on the 
world, however, requires people to deal directly with 
empirical contingency. Suchman [33] argues that “plans” 
are theoretical, often formulaic, representations of human 
actions and practices. “Situated action,” however, requires 
people to work with continuous variation and uncertainty in 
the world. Human action, she argues, is a form of iterative 
problem solving in an attempt to accomplish a task. 
Creativity often emerges within such situated and 
discretionary forms of problem solving. As Jackson & 
Kang’s [18] study of interactive artists shows, dealing with 
material mess and contingency (in this case, attached to the 
breakdown of technological systems and objects) may 
necessitate and drive forms of improvisation and creativity 
at the margins of formal order. Creativity – understood not 
as an abstract and free-standing act of cognition but rather 
as a situated sociomaterial accomplishment – emerges 
through the interplay between routines and applications, 
between plans, takes, and mis-takes, and between empirical 
mess and theoretical clarity. 
Such situated and discretionary acts are no less central to 
forms of data analysis and algorithmic knowledge studied 
and practiced by CSCW and HCI researchers. Clarke [11], 
for instance, analyzes the human collaborative work in data 
analytics that is often overlooked in the face of the growing 
“popularity of automation and statistics.” He analyzes the 
processes used by online advertising professionals to create 
user models, bringing to light ways in which we can design 
better software to accommodate the mundane, assumptive, 
and interpretive deliberation work that goes into producing 
such “social-culturally constituted” models. Pine & 
Liboiron [30] study the use of public health data, showing 
how data collection practices are actually social in nature. 
One does not simply collect “raw data.” Data collection 
practices are shaped by values and judgments about “what 
is counted and what is not, what is considered the best unit 
of measurement, and how different things are grouped 
together and ‘made’ into a measurable entity.” [30: 3147] 
Along similar lines, Vertesi & Dourish [36] show how the 
use and sharing of data in scientific collaboration depends 
on the contexts of production and acquisition from which 
such data arise. Taylor et al. [35] show how data 
materializes differently in different places by and for 
different actors. Indeed, it is precisely the erasure of these 
kinds of work that produces the troubling effects of 
neutrality, “opacity”, and self-efficacy that all too often 
clouds public understanding of “big data,” and makes 
algorithms appear ‘magical’ in learning, but also ‘real-
world’ environments [8]. 
These bodies of CSCW and HCI research call attention to 
aspects of formalism, contingency, and discretion at the 
heart of algorithmic knowledge and data analytic practices. 
An algorithm is a collection of formal rules – indeed, a 
routinizable plan of action – that organizes data in 
predictable and actionable ways. Yet each dataset poses 
unique challenges (and opportunities) for the data analyst, 
necessitating ways to accommodate the variations in the 
seemingly routine acts of “applying” algorithms. To learn 
data vision then is to learn to see similarities as well as 
differences in the ways in which data, algorithms, and 
worlds are put together. To see with data is to see the 
unknown, the different, and the singular within the space of 
the mundane and predictable. Advancing an understanding 
of data analytics as a rule-based (as opposed to a rule-
bound) practice, this paper argues that data vision is not 
merely a collection of formal and mechanical rules, but a 
situated and discretionary process requiring data analysts to 
continuously straddle the competing demands of formal 
abstraction and empirical contingency. 
METHODS AND FINDINGS 
The arguments that follow build on ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted at a major U.S. East Coast University. We 
conducted a four month long participant-observation study 
in a graduate level machine-learning class taught at the 
university in fall 2014. One of the authors was enrolled as a 
student in one section of the course with ~80 students. We 
also conducted a participant-observation study of a series of 
three digital humanities workshops organized at the same 
university during spring 2015. The workshops’ purpose was 
to expose students to computational techniques for text 
analyses. Each workshop lasted two hours, and the number 
of participants in each workshop ranged from nine to 
thirteen. 
CASE 1: MACHINE-LEARNING CLASSROOM 
Our first case follows an instance of data analysis and 
learning revealed during a machine-learning class. At the 
point we pick up the story, the instructor is about to 
introduce a type of algorithm that classifies things into 
groups (called clusters) such that things within a cluster are 
sufficiently similar to each other, and things across clusters 
are sufficiently different from each other.  
 
Figure 1. Class exercise to introduce the notion of clusters. 
The instructor starts by showing an image to the students 
(figure 1) and inquiring: how many clusters do you see? 
Most students give the same answer: “three clusters.”  
 
Figure 2. The three clusters that the students initially saw. 
Having anticipated this response, the instructor shows 
another image with three clearly marked clusters (figure 2). 
The instructor informs the students that the number of 
clusters present in the image is actually unclear: 
How many clusters? I don’t know. I haven’t even told 
you what the similarity measure is [i.e., how do you 
even know which two dots are similar to each other in 
this graph.] But, you all somehow assumed Euclidean 
Distance [i.e., the closer two dots are, the more similar 
they are.] 
He now shows other types of clusters that could have been 
“seen” (figure 3). As is clear from these images, there could 
have been two or three clusters. Moreover, there could have 
been different kinds of two clusters (figure 3a/3b) and 
different kinds of three clusters (figure 3c/3d). After the 
students have had a chance to digest this lesson, the 
instructor goes on to introduce the concept of a clustering 
algorithm:  
A clustering algorithm does partitioning. Closer points 
are similar, and further away points are dissimilar. We 
haven’t yet defined what we mean exactly by similarity, 
but it’s intuitive, right? 
Having made this point, the instructor moves on to a more 
specific algorithm. The instructor explains that this 
algorithm works on a simple principle: the similarity of two 
clusters is equal to the similarity of the most similar 
members of the two clusters. 
Having made this point, the instructor moves on to a more 
specific algorithm. The instructor explains that this 
algorithm works on a simple principle: the similarity of two 
clusters is equal to the similarity of the most similar 
members of the two clusters. The idea is to take a cluster 
(say, X), find the cluster that is most similar to it (say, Y), 
and then merge X and Y to make a new cluster. It is 
important to note that knowing the premise on which this 
algorithm functions is different from knowing how to apply 
it to data. How do we find a cluster most similar to a given 
cluster? What does it mean when we say “most similar 
members of the two clusters”? Such questions, as we will 
see, are key to this algorithm’s application. 
The instructor now demonstrates the application of this 
algorithm by drawing a 2-dimensional graph marked with 
eight dots (figure 4a). The closer the two dots are, he 
explains, the more similar they are for the purpose of this 
algorithm. At the start (figure 4a), there are no clusters but 
only a set of eight dots. The instructor tells the students that 
Figure 4. In-class exercise to learn a particular clustering algorithm. 
Figure 3. Different kinds of clusters that could have been seen. 
each dot will be treated initially as a cluster. He then starts 
to apply the algorithm beginning with dot-1. On visual 
inspection, the instructor and students infer that dot-1 is 
closer to dot-2, dot-3, and dot-4, than it is to the other dots. 
The instructor and the students then look again, and 
determine that of the three remaining points, dot-2 is the 
one closest to dot-1. Thus, based on the chosen similarity 
metric of physical distance, dot-1 and dot-2 are merged to 
form cluster-A (figure 4b). 
The instructor now moves on to dot-3. Following the same 
logic, the instructor and students infer that dot-3 is closer to 
cluster-A and dot-4 than it is to the other dots. The 
instructor reminds the students that for this algorithm, two 
clusters are compared based on their most similar members 
(i.e. two dots – one in each cluster – that are closest to each 
other). Thus, comparing dot-3 and cluster-A, he says, 
means comparing dot-3 and dot-1 (as dot-1 is the dot in 
cluster-A that is closest to dot-3). Looking at dot-3, dot-1, 
and dot-4, the instructor and students infer that dot-4 is the 
one closest to dot-3; dot-3 and dot-4 are then merged to 
form cluster-B (figure 4c). In the next two steps, the 
instructor and students go on to dot-3 and dot-4, forming 
cluster-C (figure 4d) and cluster-D (figure 4e) respectively. 
At this point, eight dots have been lost, and four clusters 
(with two dots each) gained (figure 4e). After reminding the 
students that comparing two clusters requires finding two 
dots – one in each cluster – that are closest to each other, 
the instructor moves on to cluster-A. A few students point 
out that the similarity between cluster-A and cluster-B is 
equivalent to the similarity between dot-1 and dot-3. Other 
students argue that it is equivalent to the distance between 
dot-2 and dot-4, as the distances between them look the 
same. The instructor agrees with the students, and informs 
them that these distances represent the similarity between 
cluster-A and cluster-B. The students go on to perform the 
same analysis to compare cluster-A, -C, and –D. 
With regard to cluster-A, the comparison is now down to 
three sets of distances: between a) dot-2 and dot-4, b) dot-2 
and dot-5, and c) dot-2 and dot-7. On visual inspection, the 
students observe that dot-2 is closest to dot-5. Cluster-A 
and cluster-C are therefore merged to form cluster-1 (figure 
4f). A similar operation merges cluster-B and cluster-D to 
form cluster-2 (figure 4g). In the last step, cluster-1 and -2 
are merged to form a single cluster containing all eight dots 
(figure 4h). With this, the instructor tells the students, they 
have reached the end of the exercise, having successfully 
“applied” the clustering algorithm. 
There are three striking features about the in-class exercises 
described in this section. The first is the step-by-step 
mechanical nature of the instructor’s demonstration of the 
algorithm. Explicit in the algorithm’s demonstration is a 
collection of formal rules specifying how to treat individual 
dots, how to compare two dots, how to compare a dot and a 
cluster, etc. Aspects of data vision, as we see in this case, 
are built sequentially with students learning an algorithm’s 
application as a set of mechanical and routine steps through 
which data – represented as dots – are manipulated, 
enabling the formation of similarity clusters. 
A second and related feature is the abstract nature of the 
represented and analyzed data. These exercises do not have 
a specific “real-world” context supplementing them. The 
students were never told, and they never inquired, what the 
dots and the graph represented. The dots were presented 
and analyzed simply as label-less dots on a nameless graph, 
generic representations of any and all kinds of data that this 
algorithm can work on. 
A third and final point concerns the reliance on visuals to 
demonstrate the operation of the algorithm. We see how 
visual forms such as dots, circles, and graphs helped 
students learn to “see” data in ways amenable to formal 
representation and organization. This allows the students to 
learn to manipulate the world as a set of data points arrayed 
in 2-dimensional space. The algorithm, it appears, “works” 
as long as data is in the form of dots in n-dimensions.  
While seeing and organizing the world through mechanical 
rules and abstract representations is key to data vision, 
students also need to learn to see the application of an 
abstract, generic method as a situated and discretionary 
activity. An instance of this appears in the case below. 
CASE 2: DIGITAL HUMANITIES WORKSHOPS 
Our second case follows the construction of data vision as 
revealed during a series of digital humanities workshops. 
Digital humanities, broadly put, is a research area in which 
humanists and information scientists use computational as 
well as interpretive methods to analyze data in domains 
such as history and literature. The vignette that follows 
describes how workshop conveners and students decide 
what dataset to work on and what happens when they begin 
to analyze the chosen dataset. 
It hasn’t been straightforward for the workshop conveners 
to decide what texts (i.e., data) the students should work on 
as a group not only because students have different research 
interests but also because not all texts are digitally 
available. In the first workshop session, there is a long 
discussion on how to get digitized version of texts (e.g., 
from Project Gutenberg, HathiTrust, etc.), what format to 
use (e.g., XML, HTML, or plain-text files), how to work 
with specific elements of a file (e.g., headers, tags, etc.), 
and how to clean the files (e.g., fixing formatting issues, 
removing stop-words, etc.). The students can, of course, 
simply download a novel, and start reading it right away, 
but the point of the discussion is to find ways in which the 
students can make algorithms do the work of “reading.” 
While describing ways to convert files from one format to 
another, something catches the convener’s eyes as he shows 
the students an online novel’s source code. There is a 
vertical bar (|) in certain words such as ‘over|whelming’ and 
‘dis|tance.’ At first, students suspect the digitized version 
has not been properly proofread. However, after noticing 
more and more words with the vertical bar symbol, the 
convener returns to the non-source-code version of the 
novel to discover that these are actually words that cut 
across lines with a hyphen (-). The computer has been 
joining the two parts of these words with a vertical bar. At 
this point, a student asks about ways in which she can 
recognize such errors, separating “good” from “bad” data. 
A discussion ensues about ready-to-use scripts and 
packages. Several students observe that manual reading can 
help spot such errors, but the whole point of using 
algorithms is to allow work with much more text than can 
be read and checked in this way. The discussion ends with 
no clear answers in sight. 
A second question concerns the dataset to be used for 
purposes of the common class exercises. This decision is 
reached only by the end of the second session: English 
Gothic novels. This choice is arrived at on the basis of 
convenience rather than common interest – only one student 
has a research interest in Gothic literature. But a complete 
set of English Gothic novels in digital form is perceived to 
be easier to obtain than other candidates suggested by the 
group. “The allure of the available,” as the convener 
remarks, “is a powerful thing.” But this raises another issue: 
what actually qualifies as a Gothic novel? Something with 
the word Gothic in the title? One tagged as Gothic by the 
library? Or one acknowledged as Gothic by the wider 
literary community? After some discussion, the conveners 
and students agree to ask one of the library’s digital 
curators to select a set of Gothic novels, and at the start of 
the third workshop session students are presented with 
plain-text files of 131 English Gothic novels. 
While discussing ways in which this dataset can be used, a 
student inquires whether it is possible to create a separate 
file for each novel containing only direct quotes from 
characters in the novel. The workshop convener and 
students decide to try this out for themselves and 
immediately encounter a question: how can an algorithm 
know what is and isn’t a character quote? After some 
discussion, the students decide to write a script that parses 
the text, inserting a section break each time a quotation 
mark is encountered. They surmise that this procedure will 
thereby capture all quotes as the text falling between 
sequential pairs of quotes. The total of such pairs will also 
indicate the number of quotes in each novel. Based on this 
understanding, the students create the below algorithm (in 
Python) to perform this work: 
import sys 
text = “” 
 
for line in open(sys.argv[1]): 
text += line.rstrip() + “ ” 
 
quote_segments = text.split(“\””) 
is_quote = False 
 
for segment in quote_segments: 
print “{0}\t{1}\{2}\n”.format(“Q” if is_quote else 
“N”, len(segment), segment) 
## every other segment is a quote 
is_quote = not is_quote 
When tested against one of the novels in the set however 
the results are surprising: the script has produced just one 
section break. Most students feel that this result is “wrong.” 
“Oh wow! That’s it?” “I think it didn’t even go through the 
file.” “Just one quotation mark?” To see what went wrong, 
students scroll through the chosen novel, glancing through 
the first twenty paragraphs or so. Upon inspection, they 
conclude that there is nothing wrong with their script. It is 
just that this particular novel actually does not have any 
quotes in it. (The single quotation mark that the script 
encountered was the result of an optical character 
recognition error.) This leads to a discussion of differences 
in writing styles between authors. A couple of students 
mention how some authors don’t use quotation marks, but 
instead a series of hyphens (-) to mark the beginning and 
end of character quotes. This raises a new problem. Is it 
safe to use quotation marks as proxies for character quotes, 
or should the script also look for hyphens? Are there still 
other variations that students will need to account for? 
Out of curiosity, the students randomly open a few files to 
manually search for hyphens. Some authors are indeed 
using them in place of quotation marks: 
------Except dimity, ------ replied my father. 
Others, however, are using them to mark incomplete 
sentences: 
But ‘tis impossible, ---- 
In some cases, hyphens have resulted because em-dashes 
(—) or en-dashes (–) were converted to hyphens by the 
optical character recognition system: 
Postscript--I did not tell you that Blandly… 
It is now clear to the students that if hyphens sometimes 
mark speech, they are less robust than quotation marks as 
proxies for character quotes. They decide to use only 
quotation marks for the remainder of the exercise to keep 
things “relatively simple.”  
It is now time to choose another novel to test the script. 
This time, the choice is not so random, as students want a 
novel that has many character quotes as a “good” sample or 
test case. The script is changed such that it now parses the 
text of all the novels, returning a list of novels along with 
the number of sections produced in each novel. These range 
from 0 to ~600. Since there are no pre-defined expectations 
for number of quotes in a novel, there is no way to just look 
at these numbers and know if they are accurate. However, 
some students still feel that something has gone “wrong.” 
They argue that because every quote needs two quotation 
marks, the total number of “correct” quotation marks in a 
novel should be an even number. By the same logic, the 
number of sections produced on this basis should also be 
even. But the result returned shows odd numbers for almost 
half the novels. Students open some of these “wrong” 
novels to manually search for quotation marks. After trying 
this out on five different novels, they are puzzled. The 
novels do have an even number of quotation marks in them. 
Why then is the script returning odd numbers? 
It does not take long to identify the problem. The students 
are right in pointing out that the number of quotation marks 
in a novel should be even. However, they have 
misconstrued how the script creates sections in a novel. A 
student explains this by reference to one of the novel’s in 
the set: Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho. In the 
passage below, the python script will go through the text 
inserting four section breaks: 
She discovered in her early years a taste for works of 
genius; and it was St. Aubert's principle, as well as his 
inclination, to promote every innocent means of 
happiness. <>“A well-informed mind, <>” he would 
say, <>“is the best security against the contagion of 
folly and of vice.”<> The vacant mind is ever on the 
watch for relief, and ready to plunge into error, to 
escape from the languor of idleness. 
This example shows the students that they had been 
confusing sections with section-breaks. Although the script 
creates four section-breaks in the novel, the number of 
sections created by the script is actually five. The students 
realize that the number of sections will thus be one more 
than the count of quotation marks. Since these will always 
be even, the number of sections created by the script must 
always be odd. 
The problem has now reversed itself. Whereas earlier the 
participants believed that an odd number of sections was 
“wrong”, they now agree that having an odd number of 
sections is actually “right”. Why then, they puzzle, do some 
novels have an even number of sections? The participants 
manually check out a few “even” novels to search for 
quotation marks. They discover another set of optical 
character recognition errors, formatting issues, and variance 
in authors’ writing styles that is producing the “wrong” or 
unexpected result. At the conclusion of the workshop 
session shortly thereafter, the students still do not have a 
script that can reliably extract all character quotes in an 
automated way. 
There are many ways to explain what has happened here. 
One is to say that the novels were not in the “right” format 
– they had formatting issues, exhibited style 
inconsistencies, and contained typographical errors. This, 
however, is true for most, if not all, kinds of data that 
analysts have to deal with on a daily basis. Clean, complete, 
and consistent datasets – as every data analyst knows – are 
a theoretical fantasy. Outside of theory, data is often 
inconsistent and incomplete. The requirement of prim and 
proper datasets, we argue, does not do justice either to the 
reality of the data world or to the explanation of this 
workshop exercise. 
Another explanation is that the students simply lacked skill 
and experience, and were making what some would call 
“rookie mistakes”. After all, these students were here to 
learn these methods, and were not expected to know them 
beforehand. However, the ability to identify and avoid 
“rookie mistakes” is in itself an important artifact of the 
training and professionalization of would-be professionals. 
In large part, what makes a rookie a rookie is his/her 
inability to recognize and avoid these kinds of errors. As 
sites for learning and training, classrooms and workshops 
thus provide avenues for seeing how would-be 
professionals learn to “see” and avoid “rookie mistakes.” 
Similar if less stark examples of such mistakes appeared in 
the machine-learning class (using part of training data as a 
test case, confusing correlation for causation, etc.). 
Our workshop case brings together prior knowledge, human 
decisions, and empirical contingency. The choice of the 
dataset is not a given, but a compromise between thematic 
alignment and practical accessibility. Moreover, as seen in 
the case of vertical bars, hyphens, and quotation marks, data 
is often idiosyncratic in its own ways, necessitating situated 
and discretionary forms of pre-processing. Even clearly 
articulated computational routines (e.g., search for 
quotation marks, label text between marks as a section, 
count sections, put sections in a separate file) often require 
a host of situated decisions (e.g., what novels to look at, 
what stylistic elements to account for, how to alleviate 
formatting errors, how to infer and manage empirical 
contingency, etc.). In all these ways, algorithmically 
identifying and extracting character quotes is a situated 
activity that requires practitioners to find their way around 
specificities of the data at hand. 
DISCUSSION 
The cases above provide important insight into the practice 
and professionalization of would-be data analysts. In case 
one, we saw how machine learning students learn to see 
data in forms amenable to algorithmic manipulation, and an 
algorithm’s application as a collection of formal rule-like 
steps. The rules to be followed appear methodical, rigorous, 
and mechanical, and the algorithm is demonstrated using an 
abstract representational form: label-less dots on a name-
less graph. Whether it is discerning the similarity between 
two dots or knowing ways to compare and merge clusters of 
dots, students learn to work with and organize the world 
through a fixed set of rules. Such a demonstration privileges 
an abstract understanding of data analytics, allowing 
students to learn to manipulate the world in predictable and 
actionable ways. This, we argue, is a great source of 
algorithmic strength: if the hallmark of real-world empirics 
is its richness and unpredictability, the hallmark of data 
analysis is its ability to organize and engage the world via 
abstract categorization and computationally actionable 
manipulation. 
In case two, by contrast, we saw how processes of learning 
and practicing data analysis are also situated, reflexive, and 
discretionary, in ways that abstract representations and 
mechanical demonstrations significantly understate. 
Multiple decisions were required to effectively combine the 
script with the given dataset ranging from identifying how 
to isolate character quotes, discerning ways in which quotes 
appear in data, to figuring out how to test the script. Unique 
datasets necessitate different fixes and workarounds, 
requiring a constant adjustment between prior knowledge, 
empirical contingencies, and formal methodologies. 
Making prior knowledge and abstract methods work with 
data is indeed hard work. Data may be hard to find, 
unavailable, or incomplete. Under such circumstances, 
practitioners have to make do with what they can get, in 
ways that go against the abstracted application story usually 
shared in data analytic research papers and presentations. 
Recognizing the incomplete nature of the abstracted data 
story helps situate an algorithm’s application as a site not 
only for abstract categorization and formal manipulation 
but also for discretion and creativity. Learning to apply an 
algorithm, as we saw, involves a series of situated decisions 
to iteratively, often creatively, adapt prior knowledge, data 
analytic routines, and empirical data to each other. 
Elements of creativity manifest themselves as professional 
acts of discretion in the use of abstract, seemingly 
mechanical methods. While certain datasets may share 
similarities that support mechanical applications of rules 
across contexts, mastery of operations in their mechanical 
form constitutes only one part of the professionalization of 
data analysts. Each dataset is incomplete and inconsistent in 
its own way, requiring situated strategies, workarounds, and 
fixes to make it ready and usable for data analysis. Data 
analysts are much like Suchman’s [33] problem solvers, 
Klemp et al.’s [22] musicians, and Ingold’s [17] carpenters: 
constantly negotiating with and working around established 
routines in the face of emergent empirical diversity. 
Viewing data analysis as an ongoing negotiation between 
rules and empirics helps mark a clear distinction between 
two ways of describing the professionalization and practice 
of data analytics that are relevant for CSCW and HCI 
researchers. One of these approaches data analytics as a 
rule-bound practice, in which data is organized and 
analyzed through the application of abstract and mechanical 
methods. Casting data analytics as a rule-bound practice 
helps make visible specific aspects of data analytic learning 
and practice. First, it allows data analysts to better 
understand the abstract nature of data analytic theories, 
facilitating novel ways of computationally organizing and 
manipulating the world. Second, it enables researchers to 
focus on constraints and limits of algorithmic analyses, 
providing a detailed look at some of the critical 
assumptions underlying data analyses. Finally, it allows 
students to learn not only how to work with basic, yet 
foundational, data analytic ideas, but also how to organize 
and manipulate the world in predictable and actionable 
ways. However, the same properties that make these aspects 
visible, tend to render in-visible the empirical challenges 
confronting efforts to make algorithms work with data, 
making it difficult to account for the situated, often 
creative, decisions made by data analysts to conform 
empirical contingency to effective (and often innovative) 
abstraction. What’s left is a stripped down notion of data 
analytics – analytics as rules and tools – that only tells half 
the data analytic story, understating the breadth and depth 
of human work required to make data speak to algorithms. 
Significantly underappreciating the craftsmanship of data 
analysts, the rule-bound perspective paints a dry picture of 
data analysis – a process that often comprises of artful and 
innovative ways to produce novel forms of knowledge. 
A more fruitful way to understand data analytics, we argue, 
is to see it not as rule-bound but rather as rule-based: 
structured but not fully determined by mechanical 
implementations of formal methods. In a rule-bound 
understanding, an algorithm’s application requires 
organization and manipulation of the world through abstract 
constructs and mechanical rules. In a rule-based 
understanding, however, emergent empirical contingencies 
and practical issues come to the fore, reminding us that the 
world requires a large amount of work for it to conform to 
high-level data analytic learning, expectations, and 
analyses. Following Feldman & Pentland’s [14] view of 
routines, a rule-based understanding of data analysis casts 
algorithms as ostensive as well as performative objects, 
highlighting how the performances of algorithms draw on 
and feed into their ostensive nature, and vice versa. 
Seeing data analytics as a rule-based practice focuses our 
attention on the situated, discretionary, and improvisational 
nature of data analytics. It helps make salient not only the 
partial and contingent nature of the data world (i.e., data is 
often incomplete and inconsistent), but also the role of 
human decisions in aligning the world with formal 
assumptions and abstract representations of order as 
stipulated under abstract algorithmic methods and theories. 
Data analysis is a craft, and like every other form of craft it 
is never fully bound by rules, but only based on them. A 
rule-based understanding of data analysis acknowledges 
and celebrates the lived differences between theoretical 
reality, empirical richness, and situated improvisations on 
the part of data analysts. 
It is in and through these lived differences that data analysts 
gain data vision. As with Dewey’s [12], Cohen’s [9], and 
Feldman & Pentland’s [14] descriptions of routines and 
routinized tasks, we see in data vision the always-ongoing 
negotiation between abstract algorithmic “routines” and the 
situated and reflexive “applications” of such “routines.” 
Data vision is much like an array of plans, takes, and mis-
takes [22] – a constant reminder of the situated and 
discretionary nature of the professionalization and practice 
of data analysis.  
Such an understanding of data vision can inform data 
analytic learning, research, collaboration, and practice in 
three basic ways. First, it helps focus attention on the role 
of human work in the professionalization and practice of 
data analytics; while models, algorithms, and statistics 
clearly matter, focusing on situated and discretionary 
judgment helps contextualize algorithmic knowledge, 
facilitating a better understanding of the mechanics, 
exactness, and limits of such knowledge. Algorithms and 
data don’t produce knowledge by themselves. We produce 
knowledge with and through them. The notion of data 
vision puts humans back in the algorithm. 
Second, data vision can help us better attend to the ways in 
which algorithmic results are documented, presented, and 
written up. Although algorithmic and statistical choices 
constitute a significant part of data analytic publications, 
also providing an explicit description of key decisions that 
data analysts take can not only help communicate a 
nuanced understanding of technical choices and algorithmic 
results, but also enable students as well as practitioners to 
think through aspects of their work that though may seem 
“non-technical,” greatly impact their knowledge claims. 
This helps to not only reduce the “opacity” [8] of data 
analytic practices, but also better teach and communicate, 
what some call, the “black art” or “folk knowledge” [13] of 
data analysis, contributing to the development of a 
complete and “reflective practitioner” [31]. 
Third, better understanding of data vision can help inform 
both professional training and community conversations 
around data analysis. In data analytics, and in many other 
forms of research (including our own!), we often present 
research setup, process, and results in a dry and 
straightforward manner. We had a question, we collected 
this data, we did this analysis, and here is the answer. Open 
and effective conversations about the messy and contingent 
aspects of research work – data analytic or otherwise – tend 
to escape the formal descriptions of methods sections and 
grant applications, reserved instead for water cooler and 
hallway conversations by which workarounds, ‘tricks of the 
trade’, and ‘good enough’ solutions are shared. The result is 
an excessively “neat” picture that fails to communicate the 
real practices and contingencies by which data analytic 
work proceeds. This becomes even more difficult outside 
the classroom. In industry, research centers, and other 
contexts of algorithmic knowledge production, data 
analysts often work with huge volumes of data in multiple 
teams, simultaneously interfacing with a host of other 
actors such as off-site developers, marketers, managers, and 
clients. Where the results of data analytics meet other kinds 
of public choices and decisions (think contemporary 
debates over online tracking and surveillance, or the 
charismatic power of New York Times infographics) these 
complications – and their importance – only multiply. Data 
analytic results often travel far beyond their immediate 
contexts of production, taking on forms of certainty and 
objectivity (even magic!) that may or may not be warranted, 
in light of the real-world conditions and operations from 
which they spring. Here as in other worlds of expert 
knowledge, “distance lends enchantment” [10]. 
More broadly, an understanding of data vision helps 
support the diverse forms of oft-invisible collaborative data 
analytic work. Data analysis not only warrants algorithmic 
techniques and computational forms, but also comprises 
answers to crucial questions such as what is the relation 
between data and question, what can actually be answered 
through data, what are some of the underlying assumptions 
concerning data, methods, etc. By bringing such questions – 
and, indeed, other forms of human work – to the fore, data 
vision directs our attention to forms of situated 
discretionary work enabling and facilitating data analysis. 
Data are never “raw” [15], and a large amount of work goes 
into making data speak for themselves. The notion of data 
vision can help us to identify and build acknowledgment 
and support mechanisms for sharing such folk knowledge 
that, though immensely useful, is often lost. Data vision is 
not merely about perceiving the world, but a highly 
consequential way of seeing that turns perception into 
action. Data often speak specific forms of knowledge to 
power. Like all forms of explanation, data analysis has its 
own set of biases [3, 15], assumptions [4, 7, 34], and 
consequences [4, 5, 6]. Understanding data vision allows us 
to better delineate and communicate the strengths as well as 
the limitation of such collaborative knowledge – indeed, of 
seeing the world with and through data. 
CONCLUSION 
Given our growing use of and reliance on algorithmic data 
analysis, an understanding of data vision is now integral to 
contemporary knowledge production practices, in CSCW 
and indeed many other fields. In this paper we presented 
two distinct, yet complementary, ways of learning and 
practicing data analysis. We argued in favor of a rule-based, 
as opposed to a rule-bound, understanding of data analytics 
to introduce the concept of data vision – a notion that we 
find integral, if not foundational, to the professionalization 
and practice of data analysts. We described how a better 
understanding of data vision allows us to better grasp and 
value the intimate connection between methodological 
abstraction, empirical contingency, and situated discretion 
in data analytic practice. Shedding light on the diverse 
forms of data analytic work, data vision produces a more 
open and accountable understanding of algorithmic work in 
data analytic learning and practice. 
Studying learning environments helps showcase basic, yet 
formative, aspects in the training and professionalization of 
data analysts. In this paper, using empirical examples from 
classrooms and workshops, we have described not only a 
rule-based view of data analysis, but also the outline of the 
notion and practice of data vision. Studying learning 
environments, however, has its limitations. Classrooms are 
but one step in the professionalization of data analysts. Data 
analysis, like all practices, is a constant learning endeavor. 
To better understand data analytic practice, we then need to 
also study other contexts of algorithmic knowledge 
production such as those in industry, research centers, 
startups, and even hackathons. Acting as avenues for future 
research, diverse contexts of data analyses provide 
opportunities to further and strengthen our understanding of 
data vision. In different contexts, data analysis is shaped by 
a diverse set of professional expectations and organizational 
imperatives, reminding us that the practice of data analysis 
remains a deeply social and collaborative accomplishment. 
This paper has suggested early steps in defining and 
understanding data vision. Future work will seek to extend 
and deepen this holistic approach. 
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